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Abstract
This thesis consists of two independent albeit related chapters. The first chapter introduces
concepts from mechanism design and matching theory, and discusses potential applications
of this theory, particularly in relation to dorm allocations in colleges. The second chapter
investigates a subset of the dorm allocation problem, namely that of matching roommates.
In particular, the paper looks at the probability of solvability of random instances of the
stable roommates game under the condition that preferences are not completely random and
exogenous but endogenously determined through a dependence on room choice. These probabilities are estimated using Monte-Carlo simulations and then compared with probabilities
of solving a completely random instance of the stable roommates game. Our results portray
a complex relationship between the two probabilities, suggesting avenues for future research.
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Chapter 1
Matching and College Housing
Allotment
1.1

An Overview of Matching

While traditional economic theory is concerned with markets where prices play a key role in
resource allocation, there exist markets in which there are no explicit prices that determine
how agents are “matched” to these resources. This is particularly the case when the resources
in question are other agents. Gale and Shapley (1962) provide the classic example of the
marriage market, where men and women are matched to each other given that each group
has preferences over the other. In such a market, there can be no explicit prices, although
agents value other agents differently based on their preferences.
Although a two-sided matching problem such as marriage serves as an excellent example
of a market without prices, we can also have a one-sided matching market, where agents
are matched to objects. Shapley and Scarf (1974) provide a model for such a market where
agents are endowed with an indivisible good such as a house and have preferences over all
the houses that are assigned to agents. In such a market, agents may have incentives to
exchange houses in order to maximize utility. A real life example of such a situation occurs

1

on college campuses, where students change dorm rooms at the end of the year, but dorm
rooms are usually not bought or sold with money.
The key features which characterize a matching market include the lack of a pricing
mechanism to clear the markets, the presence of heterogeneous agents and the problem
of allocating indivisible resources to these agents. Economists who study these markets
are often interested in designing an algorithm or a “mechanism” that generates allocations
which satisfy certain important properties. This can be particularly challenging because of
numerous theoretical constraints that prevent a mechanism from having all the desirable
properties (see Roth and Sotomayor (1992), and Roth (1982)). We shall discuss the nature
of some of these properties in section 1.3.

1.2

Applications of Matching Theory

Matching is not just a theoretical curiosity; while the game theoretical formulations of matching problems provide unique mathematical challenges and insights, economists are interested
in the applications of the theory to market design.
One of the first applications for matching was provided by Roth (1984) who looked into
the problem of matching medical students to hospitals for internships. This problem can be
classified as a two-sided, many-to-one matching problem. The problem is two-sided because the agents can be split into distinct groups, in this case hospitals and medical students.
It is also two-sided in the sense that both hospitals and doctors have preferences over each
other. Since many doctors are matched to a single hospital, the problem is characterized as
many-to-one matching problem. In the paper, Roth provided a history of the market and
its idiosyncrasies while also presenting a game theoretic model that captures the essential
elements of the market. Roth and Peranson (1999) actually presented a new mechanism
for matching physicians to hospitals which was adopted by the National Resident Matching
Program (NRMP).
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Matching theory was also successfully applied in the context of school choice. In many
U.S. school districts, children (and their parents) are often asked to submit the preferences
over which school they would like to attend. Schools too have preferences over children,
usually based on factors such as proximity, whether the child has siblings at the school, and
his or her grades. Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003) also formalized this problem as a
two-sided, many-to-one matching problem. They they suggested that districts use a variant
of the matching algorithm presented by Gale and Shapley (1962). New York and Boston
are two cities which adopted these recommendations and recent empirical evidence suggests
that the new mechanisms are effective in increasing the number of “good” matches.

1.3

College Housing Allotment and Stable Roommates

One interesting application of matching theory is in the context of assigning college students
to dorm rooms. Interestingly, matching theory is applicable at two levels in this context.
Firstly, the problem of students finding roommates is a two-sided, many-to-many (or one-toone) matching problem: depending on the type of rooms available, students may be looking
for many or just a single roommate. Ensuring optimal roommate matching is key to student
happiness while also making sure that the administration is not burdened with mid-year
room reassignments.
Next, the student groups need to be assigned to dormitories. This is a one-sided matching
problem as the students have preferences over rooms but the rooms do not have preferences
over students. Most colleges have a process by which students get to pick rooms; these
systems are usually designed to maximize fairness or some other objective. Abdulkadiroğlu
and Sönmez (1999) look at some of the mechanisms utilized by colleges and evaluate them
on their performance. Economists use a few typical metrics to evaluate such mechanisms.
One is incentive compatibility or strategyproofness, which asks whether students have
any incentive to misrepresent their preferences in order to “game” the system. The Colby
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College housing allotment system, for example, is famously not incentive-compatible. The
Colby dorms are stratified into various mutually exclusive housing types such as substancefree housing, quiet housing and traditional housing. Once students pick which type of housing
they want, they can select rooms only from that housing type. However, students who do
not intend to be quiet or substance free often opt into these specialty housing programs in
order to get better rooms and flout the community rules. A mechanism designer could fix
this problem by designing a system in which students have no incentive to lie about their
preferences.
Another metric for evaluating mechanisms is Pareto optimality or efficiency. Matches
are not efficient when there exists another assignment of students to rooms where no student
is worse off than in the current assignment and at least one student is strictly better off. In
this situation, students may have incentive to exchange rooms until an efficient allocation
is obtained. In order to avoid the administrative cost of supporting mid-year room reallocations, colleges should strive to generate Pareto efficient room allocations.
Efficiency is key in matching roommates to roommates as well. In the second chapter
of this thesis, we examine a stronger version of Pareto efficiency in a specialized case of
the roommate matching problem. In such a specialized (and somewhat unrealistic) setting,
students can room with only one person and have preferences over all the other students who
are looking for roommates. In this context, we can use stability as a metric to evaluate the
quality of a matching. A matching (pairing) is unstable if two students who are not rooming
with each other prefer each other as roommates to their actual roommates. Consequently, a
matching is stable if no such two students exist. Abraham and Manlove (2004) proved that
any stable matching is also Pareto optimal; the converse is not necessarily true. Gale and
Shapley (1962) demonstrated that not every instance of the stable roommates problem admits
a stable solution. In other words, for certain preference structures, no stable matching can
be found.
This fact naturally leads to some questions. What kind of preferences lead to a stable
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matching? What is the proportion of stable roommates “games” that admit a solution? Or,
equivalently, if students have arbitrary unspecified preferences over one another, what is the
probability that a stable matching exists? This last question is important because it lends
some insight into the nature of a roommate pairing. How likely are such pairings to fall
apart?
In an abstract mathematical setting, all preference structures are considered equally likely
to occur. In real life however, students’ preferences over one another are guided by a variety
of factors, and thus are not completely random. In particular, certain preference structures
are more likely to occur than others. The goal of this thesis is to investigate whether the
probability of finding a stable solution to the roommates game increases under more realistic
settings.
In the next chapter, we formalize the notion of a stable roommates game, restate the
research question rigorously and lay out the methods and results of our analysis.

5

Chapter 2
Stable Roommates with Endogenous
Preferences
2.1

Introduction

The stable marriage problem is a classic problem in matching theory which seeks to solve
the problem of pairing men and women in a marriage market where each group has complete
and strict preferences over the other. Formally, the set of agents I = IM ∪ IW is partitioned
such that |IM | = |IW | and for any m ∈ IM there exists a preference relation m such that
for any w1 , w2 ∈ IW : w1 m w2 or w2 m w1 . The preference relation for any w ∈ IW
is analogously defined. A solution to an instance of the stable marriage problem involves
finding a stable matching. This is a matching in which no pair of men and women who are
not matched to each other prefer each other to their partners under the matching.
Gale and Shapley (1962) proved that any instance of the stable marriage problem (that is,
a game with any set of complete and strict preferences) admits at least one stable matching
and supplied an algorithm to find such a matching. In the same paper they discussed the
stable roommates problem, a generalization of the marriage problem. In this problem agents
are not divided into two groups like in the marriage problem. Instead agents have strict
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preferences over every other agent.
The differences between these two problems can be understood in graph theoretic terms.
Figures 2.1a and 2.1b depict graph representations of the stable marriage and stable roommates problems respectively. Notice how in the first figure, vertices can be partitioned into
two sets such that edges from a vertex in one set can only map to vertices in the other
set. This bipartite structure captures the nature of the stable marriage problem, where the
vertices represent agents and the edges code preferences. In figure 2.1b, there is no such
partitioning. In other words, a vertex is mapped to all other vertices through edges, representing an agent’s preferences over all other agents. This captures the essence of the stable
roommates problem. A real-world example of this problem occurs when college students
attempt to find roommates to live in college dormitories.

(a) Complete bipartite graph representing the sta- (b) Complete graph representing stable roomble marriage problem. The edges code preferences mates. The edges code preferences and the verand the vertices represent agents.
tices represent agents.

Figure 2.1: Graphic theoretic interpretation of the stable marriage and roommate problems.
Unlike the stable marriage problem, the stable roommates problem does not automatically admit a solution. We construct a simple example below to demonstrate that solutions
may not exist for instances of the problem. To make the analysis of the example more
tractable, we can define the notion of a matching and a stable matching formally.
Definition 2.1.1. A matching µ : I → I is a symmetric 2-cycle permutation such that if
µ(m) = w then µ(w) = m.
Definition 2.1.2. A matching µ is said to be unstable if and only if there exist i1 , i2 ∈ I
such that µ(i1 ) 6= i2 and i2 i1 µ(i1 ) and i1 i2 µ(i2 ). A matching µ is said to be stable if it
7

is not unstable.
Example 2.1.1. (Gale-Shapley) Let A,B,C and D be agents with the following preferencesA

B

C

D

B

C

A

A

C

A

B

B

D

D

D

C

Proposition 2.1.1. There is no stable matching for this problem instance.
Proof. Let µ be one of the
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2



possible matchings. For any X ∈ {A, B, C} \ µ(D) : X µ(D)

D. Since no two members rank each other the highest ∃Y ∈ {A, B, C} \ µ(D) s.t
µ(D) Y µ(Y ).
Irving (1985) provided an algorithm that takes in agents’ preferences as an input and
returns a stable matching if one exists. If a stable matching does not exist then the algorithm
informs the user that no stable solutions exist. In this paper, we use this algorithm in order
to determine whether a given instance of the stable roommates problem has a solution.

2.1.1

Solvability of stable roommates instances

The possibility of unsolvable instances of the roommates problem raises many questions
but two are particularly pertinent. Qualitatively, we would like to know what features
of a problem instance lead to it being solvable. Quantitatively, we would like to know
the proportion of problem instances that are solvable for any n-person game. The former
question was resolved by Tan (1991) who established necessary and sufficient conditions for
the solvability of a stable roommates instance. In fact Chung (2000) provides a sufficient
condition for the existence of stable matchings when agents have weak (not necessarily strict)
preferences.
The latter question is still unresolved although non-trivial progress has been made in
p
that direction. In particular, Pittel (1993) proved that Pn ≥ 4e3 /πn, where Pn denotes the
8

probability that an n-person stable roommates instance is solvable. In the same paper, Pittel
also provided an analytical expression for Pn , a version of which is presented in section 2.2.4.
Further, Pittel and Irving (1994) provided a loose upper bound for the limiting behavior
√
of Pn by establishing that limn→∞ Pn ≤ e/2. Mertens (2005) supplied some empirical
evidence for conjectures about the asymptotic behavior of Pn .

2.1.2

Partially endogenous preferences

Research on the stable roommates problem traditionally treats preferences as exogenous.
While such a simplification is important to understand the theoretical properties of the
stable roommates game, particularly with respect to solvability, it is hardly an assumption
that holds in practical applications. For example, if we consider the case of an actual room
selection problem, we know that roommate choice is inextricable from the choice of room
itself. In particular, preferences over roommates are generally not independent of preferences
over rooms and ceteris paribus one would expect two agents with similar room rankings to
rank each other higher on their preference lists.1
Pittel (1993) asserts that “stable partners are very likely to be relatively close to the tops
of each other’s preference lists”. Given this observation, it is highly plausible that the probability of finding a stable solution for any given problem with partially endogenous preferences
is higher than the probability of finding a stable solution for a random instance of stable
roommates with exogenous preferences. Note we use the phrase partially endogenous because
the roommate preferences have both a stochastic and a deterministic component; the similarity of dorm room preferences between agents acts like a shock to otherwise idiosyncratic
roommate preferences.
The goal of this chapter is to consider statistical evidence for the claim that the probability
of finding a stable solution for a given problem instance is higher in the case where we have
endogenous preferences vis-a-vis exogenous preferences.
1

Notice that the dependence goes both ways i.e. room rankings affect roommate preferences and viceversa. For simplicity, we assume room rankings to be exogenous.
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2.2
2.2.1

Methods
Setting up the model.

For very small instances of the roommates problem, the proportion of stable instances can be
calculated using exhaustive enumeration or through a multidimensional integral formulation
(see section 2.2.4). However, since the number of possible preference sets for an n-person
game is given by [(n − 1)!]n , even for modest values of n, exhaustive enumeration becomes
practically impossible. Instead, Monte Carlo simulations are used to estimate the probability
Pn of an n-person game instance having a stable solution.
In order to generate preference lists for the agents, we can use an n × n matrix X of
independently and uniformly distributed random variables on [0, 1]. For this to make sense,
we must first formalize the set of agents by coding them into natural numbers that correspond
with the rows and columns of the matrix X.
Definition 2.2.1. The set of agents is given by I = {1, 2, . . . n}.
Next we can define the preference relation i as follows
Definition 2.2.2. ∀j1 , j2 ∈ I \ {i} : j1 i j2 ⇐⇒ Xi,j1 > Xi,j2 .
This process yields a complete and strict preference list for each agent i ∈ I. We provide an
example to illustrate this fact.
Example 2.2.1. I = {1, 2, 3, 4}.

0.17

0.95

X=
0.60


0.61

0.22 0.75
0.74 0.57
0.87 0.51
0.25 0.95


0.20

0.26


0.45


0.08

Note that the diagonal entries are irrelevant and so, using definition 2.2.2, we can define the
preference relation for each agent i ∈ I.
10

1: 3 1 2 1 4
2: 1 2 3 2 4
3: 2 3 1 3 4
4: 3 4 1 4 2
As one can see, the preference list above is complete and strict. Interestingly, this preference
list is similar to the one found in example 2.1.1 and thus does not admit a stable solution.

2.2.2

Adding exogenous room preferences

In order to construct a model with endogenous roommate preferences, we first need to add
exogenous room preferences for every agent in the game. Let I be the set of agents in the
model.
Definition 2.2.3. Let H be the set of rooms such that |H| = |I|/2.2
Just like in section 2.2.1, we can construct preferences over houses using a matrix of
independently and uniformly distributed random variables, except now the dimensions of
the matrix are n × n/2. Given that we now have two sets of preferences for each agent we
need to introduce some new notationDefinition 2.2.4. Let i,h , i ∈ I, h ∈ H denote the preference relation of agent i over
rooms.
Thus h1 i,h h2 denotes that agent i prefers room h1 to room h2

2.2.3

Endogenizing roommate preferences

In order to partially endogenize the roommate preferences of the agents in our model using
room choice, we need to find a way to measure the similarity between room rankings that the
agents reveal. One good measure of ordinal association is Kendall’s Tau (see Abdi (2007)
2

I has even cardinality.
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or Appendix A for details), a function that takes two rankings and returns the ordinal
correlation between the two. A correlation of 1 indicates that the rankings are perfectly
aligned; in our case, since the rooms ranked are the same for all agents, a correlation of 1
indicates that the rankings are identical. A correlation of -1 indicates that the ranking is
reversed.
This correlation can be used to shock the model in a way which allows us to generate
preferences which incorporate room choice similarity. The best way to demonstrate how we
achieve this in our model is through an example.
Example 2.2.2. Let I = {1, 2, 3, 4}, H = {h1 , h2 }.
We are given the following rooming preferences1: h1 1,h h2
2: h2 2,h h1
3: h2 3,h h1
4: h1 4,h h2

Let τi,j indicate the Kendall ordinal association between the room preferences of agents i and
j. Since we only have two rooms, the number of possible permutations of room preferences
is just two. This means that the only possible values for τ are 1 or -1.
Table 2.1: Ordinal association between room preference lists.
Kendall’s τ
τ1,2 -1 τ2,3 1
τ1,3 -1 τ2,4 -1
τ1,4 1 τ3,4 -1
Now we can use the same n × n matrix X of uniform random variables on (0,1) as seen
in example 2.2.1 and add the τ values as shocks to this matrix in the following sense.

We have the original matrix-
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0.17

0.95

X=
0.60


0.61

0.22 0.75
0.74 0.57
0.87 0.51
0.25 0.95


0.20

0.26


0.45


0.08

Next we construct an augmented matrix X̄ in which X̄i,j = Xi,j + τi,j wherever τi,j is defined
– i.e. the off diagonal values. Remember that since Kendall’s Tau is a correlation coefficient, τi,j = τj,i and thus this addition operation is performed symmetrically on the matrix X.








0.22 − 1 0.75 − 1 0.20 + 1  0.17 −0.78 −0.25 1.20 
 0.17

 

0.95 − 1
 −0.05 0.74

0.74
0.57
+
1
0.26
−
1
1.57
−0.74

 

X̄ = 
=

0.60 − 1 0.87 + 1


0.51
0.45 − 1 −0.40 1.87
0.51 −0.55



 

0.61 + 1 0.25 − 1 0.95 − 1
0.08
1.61 −0.75 −0.05 0.08
Now we use the augmented matrix to construct the preferences:
1: 4 1 3 1 2
2: 3 2 1 2 4
3: 2 3 1 3 4
4: 1 4 3 4 2
It is clear here that µ = {(1, 4), (2, 3)} is a stable matching as the partner for each agent is
at the top of their preference list.

2.2.4

Finding theoretical values for the solvability probability

The purpose of this paper is to determine if the additional information about room choice
leads to a greater proportion of stable outcomes for roommate games. In order to conduct
such a study, we use Monte-Carlo simulations of random instances of the stable roommates
game. However, the probability of finding a stable solution for a random n-game can also
be computed exactly, using a method first elucidated by Knuth (1976). This method was

13

adapted by Pittel (1993) for the stable roommates problem. We present a slightly modified
version of the latter’s results here.
Consider the framework employed in previous sections. Random preferences are generated using an n × n matrix X of uniform random variables on [0, 1].
Definition 2.2.5. Let the complete matching space M = {{i, j}|1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n}.
Definition 2.2.6. Let the standard matching M0 = {{i, i + n2 }|1 ≤ i ≤ n2 }.
Definition 2.2.7. Let Ai,j denote the event that (Xi,j > Xi,i+ n2 )

T

(Xj,i > Xj,j+ n2 ).

3

Definition 2.2.8. Let C = {(x1 , . . . , xn )|0 ≤ xi ≤ 1} be the n-dimensional cube.
Proposition 2.2.1. Let Pn denote the probability that M0 is stable. Then
Z
Pn =

Y

1 − (1 − xi )(1 − xj )dx,

dx = dx1 dx2 . . . dxn .

C {i,j}∈M c
0

Proof. Note that under M0 , {i, i + n2 } and {j, j + n2 } are two matched pairs. If event Ai,j
occurs, however, players i and j would have incentive to match with each other rather than
their partners under the matching. This would render the matching unstable. Thus M0
would be stable if and only if this event did not occur for any agents i and j who are not
matched to each other under M0 . We can formalize this as follows. Pairs which are not
matched to each other under M0 belong in the set M0c = M \ M0 . For M0 to be stable we
need Ai,j to not occur for all {i, j} ∈ M0c . Suppose that S is the event that M0 is stable.
Then
S=

\
{i,j}∈M0c

3

Note that these addition operations are modulo n.
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Aci,j .

Let Xα,α+ n2 = xα be observed for all α ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Then
P (Ai,j |Xi,i+ n2 = xi , Xj,j+ n2 = xj ) = P ((Xi,j > xi )

\
(Xj,i > xj ))

= P (Xi,j > xi )P (Xj,i > xj )
= (1 − xi )(1 − xj )

where the second equality is due to the independence of Xi,j and Xj,i and the third equality is
due to the fact that all elements of X are uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Taking complements,
we have that
P (Aci,j |Xi,i+ n2 = xi , Xj,j+ n2 = xj ) = 1 − (1 − xi )(1 − xj ).
Now in order to deduce the expression for P (S), we first look at the conditional probability
P (S|X). At this point we switch notations to accommodate the use of probability density
functions

P (S|X1,1+ n2 = x1 , . . . , Xn+ n2 = xn ) = f (S|X1,1+ n2 = x1 , . . . , Xn+ n2 = xn )


\
=f
Aci,j X1,1+ n2 = x1 , . . . , Xn+ n2 = xn 
(i,j)∈M0c

=

Y

f Aci,j |X1,1+ n2 = x1 , . . . , Xn+ n2 = xn



{i,j}∈M0c

=

Y

1 − (1 − xi )(1 − xj ).

{i,j}∈M0c

Using rules of conditional probability, we have that

f S, X1,1+ n2 = x1 , . . . , Xn+ n2 = xn





=f S|X1,1+ n2 = x1 , . . . , Xn+ n2 = xn f X1,1+ n2 = x1 , . . . , Xn+ n2 = xn .
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[Ind. Events]

i.i.d

Since X1,1+ n2 , . . . Xn,n+ n2 ∼ U (0, 1)


f X1,1+ n2 = x1 , . . . , Xn+ n2 = xn =

n
Y

f (Xi,i+ n2 ) =

i=1

n
Y

1 = 1.

i=1

Therefore



f S, X1,1+ n2 = x1 , . . . , Xn+ n2 = xn = f S|X1,1+ n2 = x1 , . . . , Xn+ n2 = xn
Y
=
1 − (1 − xi )(1 − xj ).
{i,j}∈M0c

Integrating out the other variables, we can find the marginal density
Z
Pn = f (S) =

Y

1 − (1 − xi )(1 − xj )dx,

dx = dx1 dx2 . . . dxn .

C {i,j}∈M c
0

Note that while we have ostensibly found Pn associated with a specific matching M0 , the
“order” of the agents in the game can be rearranged so that M0 will represent any arbitrary
matching. Thus we have found an analytic expression for the probability that an arbitrary
matching is stable in a random n-game.
Unfortunately, the integral is quite difficult to evaluate, both numerically and analytically.
As such, for large values of n, the integral expression yields little insight into the actual value
for Pn . Nevertheless, we present some values of Pn computed from this integral by Mertens
(2005) in table 2.2. These values can be used as a validity check for our Monte-Carlo
simulations.
Table 2.2: Probability of solvability for stable roommates instances of size n

P4
P6

Pn
0.963 P8
0.933 P10
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0.910
0.891

2.2.5

Monte-Carlo methods

The main results of this paper are derived computationally, using Monte-Carlo simulations
in order to compute the probability of finding a stable solution for a game of size n. Two
probabilities are of importance here, described in table 2.3.
Table 2.3: The two kinds of probabilities.
Parameters
Probability of finding a stable solution for a game
Pn,o
of size n with no information about room choice
Probability of finding a stable solution for a game
Pn,r
of size n with partially endogenous preferences
In order to derive estimates for these probabilities, we implement the procedure outlined
in sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.3 along with Irving’s algorithm (see an overview in appendix B) to
determine whether a random instance of the stable roommates game under the appropriate
conditions has a stable solution. This can be described by the Bernoulli random variable

B=




1

The instance has a stable solution



0

The instance has no stable solution.

If we conduct m such trials, then

Y =

m
X

Bi ∼ Binom(m, p)

i=1

where p = Pn,r or Pn,o depending on whether we are simulating a model with or without
partially endogenous preferences respectively. Since p is not observed, the goal of conducting
this simulation is to find a good estimator p̂ of p. We use the standard estimator

p̂ =

Y
m

as it is unbiased and consistent (Wackerly et al., 2007) with variance V (p̂) = p(1 − p)/m.
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Note that
m

Y
1 X
p̂ =
=
Bi = B ∼ N
m
m i=1



p(1 − p)
p,
m

by the Central Limit Theorem. From this fact, and by using the method of moment generating functions, we can deduce that for independent estimators p̂1 and p̂2 of p1 and p2 ,


p1 (1 − p1 ) p2 (1 − p2 )
+
p̂1 − p̂2 ∼ N p1 − p2 ,
m1
m2
where m1 , m2 denote sample sizes. Now we are ready to present our hypothesis

∀n ∈ 2N \ {2}

H0 : Pn,o = Pn,r
Ha : Pn,o < Pn,r .

Since this is a one-tailed test (our conjecture entails a direction for the difference), we shall
use relatively small significance levels in order to minimize the possibility of a Type I error.
Given this framework, we have the test statistic

Zt = q

p̂n,r − p̂n,o
p̂n,r (1−p̂n,r )
mn,r

+

p̂n,o (1−p̂n,o )
mn,o

∼ N (0, 1).

We can reject the null hypothesis when

P (Z > Zt ) ≤ 0.025.

2.3

Results

Running the Monte-Carlo simulation in Python (see appendix D for the code), we can
generate estimates for Pn,o and Pn,r and use the hypothesis test described in the previous
section to deduce whether Pn,r > Pn,o . Figure 2.2 shows the graph of such a simulation
where m1 = m2 = 1000. The dotted line in the figure depicts the actual values of Pn,o ,
18

calculated using the multidimensional integral formula described in section 2.2.4. The solid
line indicates estimates of the probability of solvability without any information about room
preferences i.e. p̂n,o . The dashed line indicates estimates for the probability of solvability
with the additional informaton about room preferences; i.e p̂n,r .

1
p^n;0
p^n;r
Pn;o

0.95

Probability

0.9

0.85

0.8

0.75

0.7

0.65
0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Size (n)

Figure 2.2: Graph of probabilities estimated using Monte-Carlo simulations with sample
sizes of 1000.

Both probabilities appear to be decreasing functions of n; this is consistent with the literature (Gusfield and Irving 1989; Mertens 2005). Worryingly, the values of p̂n,o appear to be
biased with respect to Pn,o . In particular, our estimator seems to consistently underestimate
the probability of solving a stable roommates instance. While inferring the existence of a
bias based on single samples is highly speculative, particularly when we only have four values for Pn,o , robustness checks conducted in section 2.4.1 reveal that the bias indeed exists.
However, it is reasonable to believe that if any bias exists, it is systematic and thus affects
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our estimates p̂n,o and p̂n,r in the same fashion, leaving our hypothesis tests valid.4
Table 2.4: Z-test for proportions with a sample size of 10000

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

n

p̂n,o

p̂n,r

p-value

4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
30

0.969
0.892
0.829
0.777
0.726
0.725
0.733
0.732
0.734
0.717
0.739
0.720
0.734
0.750

0.871
0.882
0.863
0.841
0.799
0.781
0.782
0.760
0.759
0.710
0.707
0.661
0.700
0.680

1
0.738
0.020∗
0.0002∗
0.0001∗
0.002∗
0.006∗
0.083
0.109
0.617
0.939
0.997
0.949
1.000

Table 2.4 shows the results of conducting the hypothesis test. As one can see, we can
reject the null hypothesis only for a small fraction of the games. In particular, we can reject
the null hypothesis for games of size 10,12,14. Indeed, for some games, the inverse hypothesis
appears to be true i.e. Pn,o > Pn,r .
These results are borne out in the graph where we see the dashed line intersect the solid
line at two points. Between these two points we have that p̂n,r > p̂n,o , the only points
where our alternative hypothesis could hold. This suggests that endogenizing roommate
preferences using exogenous room preferences does not significantly increase the probability
of solvability of roommate problems for general n.
In order to confirm these results, we conduct a number of robustness exercises.
4

For a more formal discussion of this claim, see appendix C.
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2.4

Robustness Checks

While one can imagine a plethora of modifications that can be utilized as robustness checks,
there are a few that are particularly important in order to establish the veracity of the
results.
• Increasing the sample size: We have conducted our simulation with a sample size
of 1000 for both probabilities for each value of n. Increasing the sample size to 10,000
may yield more robust results.
• Looking at larger values of n: One important way to establish if our results hold
for general n is to conduct the simulation for larger values of n.
These are fairly straightforward extensions, and we present results from the new simulations
in the following sections.

2.4.1

Increasing the sample size

In this simulation, we choose m1 = m2 = 10000. Figure 2.3 shows the graph of this simulation. This graph can be interpreted akin to figure 2.2, although the color scheme employed
is different. Notice that we see the continuing inverse relationship between n and Pn . This
confirms the result we got in section 2.3. Again, we see that p̂n,o is a biased estimator of Pn,o ,
consistently underestimating the true value of the probability of solving a stable roommates
instance. Just like in figure 2.2, the graph for p̂n,r crosses the graph of p̂n,o twice. For values
of n between those two points, it is possible that our alternative hypothesis holds. Table 2.5
shows the result of the hypothesis test.
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Figure 2.3: Graph of probabilities estimated using Monte-Carlo simulations with a sample
size of 10000

In a somewhat sharp contrast with the result found in section 2.3, we see a number of
significant tests. This is possibly due to the fact that a large sample size decreases the size of
the standard error of our estimator, leading to more extreme test statistics and thus smaller
p-values. In the case of a one-sided test, such as this one, extreme test statistics can also
lead to extremely large p-values. Indeed, the number of outcomes which are particularly not
significant have surfaced as well.
These results essentially confirm the results we arrived at in section 2.3, albeit with greater
precision. This is the expected outcome of increasing the sample size of the experiment.
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Table 2.5: Z-test for proportions with a sample size of 10000

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

2.4.2

n

p̂n,o

p̂n,r

p-value

4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
30

0.957
0.880
0.817
0.781
0.771
0.752
0.727
0.718
0.708
0.738
0.742
0.744
0.725
0.752

0.851
0.871
0.866
0.837
0.793
0.774
0.763
0.732
0.751
0.680
0.704
0.692
0.667
0.697

1
0.978
0∗
0∗
0.0001∗
0.0001∗
0∗
0.016∗
0∗
1
1
1
1
1

Looking at larger values of n

While we have observed the behavior of both p̂n,r and p̂n,o for n up to 30, it is reasonable to
question whether the outcomes we observe persist for higher values of n. In particular, we
would like to verify if we can reject the null hypothesis in favor of our alternative hypothesis
for higher values of n. Looking at figure 2.4, it appears that for larger values of n, the opposite
hypothesis holds true. In other words, it appears as if Pn,o > Pn,r . Indeed, examining table
2.6, we see that the p-values are extremely high, suggesting that if we inverted the hypothesis
test, we would have significant results. This strongly suggests that our hypothesis does not
hold true for values of n greater than 20.
While this appears to be a negative result, it spawns numerous interesting questions.
Since the process outlined in section 2.2.3 generates preferences that should ideally lead to
more players being ranked highly in each others’ preference lists, one would expect that on
average more matches would be stable but this is not the case.
An avenue of future research could be investigating why we see the counter-intuitive
results that we have generated here.
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Table 2.6: Z-test for proportions with a sample size of 1000 for n up to 94. Most values are
omitted due to redundancy.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

n

p̂n,o

p̂n,r

p-value

32
34
36
38
40
42
54
56
58
84
86
88
90
92
94

0.780
0.760
0.754
0.710
0.720
0.842
0.818
0.771
0.791
0.810
0.818
0.902
0.870
0.923
0.824

0.570
0.642
0.644
0.641
0.581
0.652
0.521
0.598
0.543
0.566
0.592
0.563
0.603
0.571
0.557

1
1
1.000
0.999
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
p^n;0
p^n;r
Pn;o

0.95
0.9

Probability

0.85
0.8
0.75
0.7
0.65
0.6
0.55
0.5
0
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20

30
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50

60

70

80

90

100

Size (n)

Figure 2.4: Graph of probabilities estimated for n ≤ 100 using Monte-Carlo simulations with
a sample size 1000
24

The next two robustness checks involve modifying the manner in which the Kendall’s tau
values are used to generate the partially endogenous preferences. We conduct these checks
to ensure that an arbitrary choice of functional form does not have a significant effect on the
results.

2.4.3

Modifying the k-factor

Refer back to section 2.2.3. Remember that we construct the augmented matrix X̄ from the
matrix X of independent, uniform random variables by using the Kendall’s tau values by
the formula
X̄i,j = Xi,j + τi,j
where τi,j represents the rank correlation between the room preferences of agents i and j.
Since the random variables are uniform on [0, 1] and the values τi,j ∈ [−1, 1], this addition
can have a potentially large effect on the ordinality of the random variables in each row of
the matrix, thus changing the preference lists generated from the rows. Since ordinality is of
paramount importance (as opposed to magnitude), it is worth wondering if a larger change in
the values of the random variables would lead to different preference lists and thus different
outcomes for stability. This is important as we do not want the fact that τ is bounded in
[-1,1] to affect the results of our model. Thus we can modify our augmentation process as
follows
X̄i,j = Xi,j + kτi,j ,

k > 1.

Choosing k = 2 while letting m1 = m2 = 1000, we run the Monte-Carlo simulations to
yield figure 2.5. Clearly, the probability paths appear to be less smooth, although this could
simply be due to random errors in sampling.
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Table 2.7: Z-test for proportions with a sample size of 1000, k = 2

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

n

p̂n,o

p̂n,r

p-values

4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
30

0.948
0.887
0.938
0.819
0.679
0.710
0.712
0.684
0.713
0.730
0.754
0.736
0.803
0.750

0.850
0.890
0.813
0.874
0.830
0.810
0.779
0.705
0.734
0.653
0.682
0.707
0.648
0.718

1
0.444
1
0.0004∗
0∗
0.00000∗
0.0004∗
0.166
0.159
1.000
1.000
0.919
1
0.942
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p^n;r
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0.95
0.9

Probability
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Figure 2.5: Graph of probabilities estimated using Monte-Carlo simulations with a sample
size of 1000 and k = 2
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In table 2.7, we see the results of the hypothesis tests which are essentially consistent
with the results we obtained earlier. The proportion of significant outcomes is slightly larger
and the significant (and near significant) values lie in the same range of n-values as seen
earlier.

2.4.4

Trying a multiplicative model

As seen in sections 2.2.3 and 2.4.3, we have utilized an additive model in order to construct
the augmented matrix X̄. As a robustness exercise, we can relax the assumption of this specific functional form and see if the results still hold. In particular, we can try a multiplicative
model and observe if the results we obtain are consistent with the ones obtained from the
additive model. In the multiplicative model, the augmented matrix is constructed using the
formula
X̄i,j = τi,j Xi,j .
Using this framework and setting m1 = m2 = 1000 as usual, we arrive at the results encapsulated in figure 2.6 and table 2.8. Here the results are far more ambiguous than in other
iterations of the model, with significant test outcomes being sparsely distributed between
the values of n = 6 and n = 20.
The results from this model are hard to interpret; while they don’t invalidate our earlier
results, the also do not seem to suggest that our model is robust to changes in the functional
form of the matrix augmentation process.
Overall, the robustness analysis seems to reveal that our initial hypothesis was illconceived. Future research should aim to uncover the underlying structure of stable roommates with random preferences where the preferences are not generated from a uniform
distribution. This should lend insight into the results obtained here.
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Figure 2.6: Graph of probabilities estimated using Monte-Carlo simulations in multiplicative
mode with a sample size of 1000

Table 2.8: Z-test for proportions with a sample size of 1000 in a multiplicative model

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

n

p̂n,o

p̂n,r

p-values

4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
30

0.977
0.856
0.849
0.818
0.702
0.758
0.738
0.806
0.713
0.756
0.717
0.726
0.743
0.767

0.850
0.902
0.849
0.843
0.790
0.758
0.815
0.703
0.756
0.690
0.592
0.615
0.671
0.702

1
0.001∗
0.500
0.076
0.00000∗
0.500
0.00002∗
1.000
0.017∗
0.999
1
1.000
1.000
0.999
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2.5

Conclusion

Our results, although ambiguous, provide evidence that our hypothesis does not universally
hold true. That is to say, partially endogenous preferences do not necessarily lead to a
higher probability of finding a stable solution to an instance of the roommates game. This
is surprising, given the fact that the process outlined in section 2.2.3 should lead to greater
reciprocity in roommate rankings across students. In particular, we would expect students
with similar room choices to rank each other highly and students with dissimilar room
choices to rank each other poorly. Consistent rankings should, in turn, lead to more stable
matchings, as asserted by Pittel (1993).
The counter-intuitive results suggest two interpretations. One could be that the bias
observed in our estimates has simply rendered our results meaningless. If order to test this
case, replication studies should be conducted to ensure that the results obtained here are
robust.
The second, and perhaps more important interpretation, is that the mathematical structure of this game yields counter-intuitive results. In order to investigate this second line
of thought, we suggest an approach akin to the one followed in section 2.2.4 where we construct a formula for the exact value of Pn,o . The principal hindrance in constructing a similar
formula for the value of Pn,r is due to the difficulty in deriving a sampling distribution for
Kendall’s τ . If an approximate distribution could be found, then we could use the method
of distributions to derive a distribution for the the sum of a uniform and τ random variable
and consequently deduce a formula for Pn,r . We hope to continue research into this line of
inquiry in the future.
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Chapter 3
Appendices
A

Kendall’s Tau

The measure of ordinal association used in this project is Kendall’s tau (τ ). A correlation, τ
is bounded in [-1,1] where 1 represents perfect positive correlation and -1 represents perfect
negative correlation. In order to understand how this correlation works, we first give a formal
definition of τ and then provide an example to motivate the intuition behind the metric.
Let X = {x1 , . . . , xn } be a collection of n unspecified objects. Then let R be the space
of all possible rankings of the objects in X. Every ri ∈ R represents a permutation of the
set {1, 2, . . . , n}. Clearly |R| = n!. Now for any ri ∈ R, let ria denote the rank of xa in the
ranking ri . Thus if ri5 = 6, we have that in the ith ranking in R, object x5 is ranked in the
6th position.
Definition A.1. Given two rankings ri , rj ∈ R, the pair (xa , xb ) is called concordant if and
only if
sgn(ria − rib )(rja − rjb ) = 1
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where

sgn(x) =





1





x > 0;

0






−1

x = 0;
x < 0.

Similarly, (xa , xb ) is called discordant if and only if

sgn(ria − rib )(rja − rjb ) = −1.

Informally, this tells us that a concordant pair is a pair of objects xa , xb in X which are
ranked consistently by two rankings ri and rj . That is to say, either xa  xb in both ri , rj
or xb  xa in both ri , rj . A discordant pair is ranked inconsistently.
Definition A.2. Given two rankings ri , rj ∈ R, let C equal the number of concordant pairs
in X and let D equal the number of discordant pairs in X. Then the Kendall’s τ coefficient
can be defined as
τij =

C −D
.
C +D

Now we can explore the intuition behind this further with an example.
Example A.1. Suppose two Colby students, code named 1 and 2, are asked to rank four
dorms in their order of preference. The dorms are named Dana, Foss, Woodman and

Coburn.1 The students rank the dorms in table 3.1. There are a total of 42 = 6 pairs
Table 3.1: Dorm rankings by students 1 and 2

1

Dorm

r1

r2

Dana
Foss
Woodman
Coburn

2
3
1
4

4
2
1
3

These are actual dorms at Colby College.
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we can examine here. Since Woodman is ranked as the favorite dorm by both students, we
already have three concordant pairs. Now (Dana,Foss) is a discordant pair since student 1
prefers Dana to Foss but student 2 prefers Foss to Dana. Similarly, (Dana, Coburn) is a
discordant pair. However, (Foss, Coburn) is a concordant pair.
Thus, C = 4, D = 2 and so
τ12 =

1
4−2
= = 0.33
4+2
3
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B

Irving’s Algorithm

The workhorse behind this project is Irving’s algorithm as we need it in order to determine
if a given instance of the stable roommates game admits a stable solution. Given the pivotal
role it plays in this research, it is imperative that we give an overview of the algorithm. Note
that this appendix does not provide a discussion on the correctness or the performance of
this algorithm; an exhaustive deliberation on these topics can be found in Irving (1985) or
Gusfield and Irving (1989). Before we actually discuss the details of the algorithm, we must
set up the roommates game formally.
Let A be the space of agents such that |A| = n where n is even. For every a ∈ A, let
Pa denote the ordered preference list consisting of agents from A \ {a}. Treating Pa as a
column vector, we can generate the preference matrix T by horizontally concatenating Pa
for every a ∈ A. In this case, Ti,j denotes the agent which occupies the ith position in agent
j’s preference list Pj .
A preference table, on the other hand, describes a reduced preference matrix in which
some entries have been deleted. This reduction is always done symmetrically, in that if agent
a is deleted from agent b’s preference list, then b is also removed from a’s preference list.
Formally, we say that the pair (a, b) is removed from the preference matrix. New preference
tables can be derived from reducing old ones in the manner specified here.

Phase 1
The algorithm can be conceptually (and computationally) divided into two phases, the first
of which is reminiscent of the deferred acceptance algorithm provided by Gale and Shapley
(1962) for the stable marriage problem. In order to understand the steps of this phase, we
must define the notions of a free and semiengaged agent.
s
Definition B.1. The semiengagement relation ∼ is a non symmetric relation such that for
s
any x, y ∈ A, x ∼ y denotes that y holds a proposal from x. In this case, we say x is
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s
semiengaged to y. If there is no y ∈ A such that x ∼ y then x is said to be free.
s
Note that the non symmetric nature of this relation is important. If a ∼ b, it could be that
s
b is free or that b ∼ c for some c ∈ A \ {a}.
Now we can describe the algorithm recursively/inductively. In the initial state (base
case) of the game, all agents are free. Then, a random agent a proposes to the person at
s
the top of his preference list Pa (1) = b. Thus a ∼ b. When this happens, all agents c such
that b a c are removed symmetrically from the preference matrix by the reduction process
described earlier, yielding a preference table.
Proceeding inductively, at any arbitrary stage in the algorithm, a free person x makes a
proposal to the person at the top of their preference list (say y), if the list is not empty. Note
that that y would not reject x immediately, since if y had held a better offer x would already
have been rejected due to the reduction process described above. This algorithm continues
to iterate unless there are no free persons (everyone is semiengaged) or if there is a person
who runs out of people to propose to (their preference list is empty). If it is the latter case,
the algorithm tells us that no stable matching exists (see Gusfield and Irving, 1989, Chapter
4). In case of the former, we can have two situations. In the first, the preference table is
reduced to the form where each preference list contains a single agent. This represents a
stable matching (Irving 1985; Gusfield and Irving 1989). If we have more than one agent in
any preference list, we need to move to Phase 2 of the algorithm. The pseudocode shown
below in Algorithm 1 provides the steps to Phase 1 of Irving’s algorithm. Remember that
the reduction referred to in the pseudocode follows the process outlined in paragraph 3 of
this section. In order to illustrate Phase 1 concretely, we provide an example.
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Data: Preference Matrix
Result: Reduced Preference Table
A ← [a1 , a2 . . . an ] /* Generate agents
T ← [P1 , P2 , . . . , Pn ] /* generate preference matrix
while ∃a ∈ Afree s.t. Pa 6= ∅ do
b ← Pa (1)
s
if c ∼ b then
c.status ← free
end
s
assign a ∼ b.
0
0
while ∃a ∈ A s.t. a b a do
0
T ← T \ (b, a )
end
end
if T has only one entry per column then
return T
end
if T has an empty column then
return No solution exists
end

*/
*/

if T has multiple entries per column then
Go to phase 2
end
Algorithm 1: Pseudocode for Phase 1 of Irving’s algorithm
Example B.1. Let A,B,C,D,E and F be agents with the following preference table.
A

B

C

D

E

F

B

D

D

F

F

A

D

E

E

C

C

B

F

F

F

A

D

D

C

A

A

E

B

C

E

C

B

B

A

E

We can execute phase 1 as follows. It would be helpful to the reader to follow along with a
paper and pencil, and cross out entries in the preference table as they are removed.
s
• A proposes to B; A ∼ B. (B,C) is removed from the preference table.
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s
• B proposes to D; B ∼ D.
s
• C proposes to D; D rejects B and so B is free and C ∼ D. (D,A),(D,E),(D,B) are
removed from the table.
s
• B proposes to E; B ∼ E. (E,A) is removed from the table.
s
• D proposes to F; D ∼ F. (F,C),(F,E) are removed from the table.
Let’s take a break and look at the state of the preference table.
A

B

C

D

E

F

B

D

D

F

F


A

D

E

E

C

C

B

F

F

F


A

D

D

C

A

A

E


B

C

E


C

B

B

A

E


In this reduced table, slashes denote deletion whereas circles denote semiengagement. Since
agents E and F are still free, the algorithm continues to iterate.
s
• E proposes to C; E ∼ C. (C,A) is removed from the table.
s
• F proposes to A. F ∼ A.
Let’s examine the preference table again.
A

B

C

D

E

F

B

D

D

F

F


A

D

E

E

C

C

B

F

F

F


A

D

D

C

A

A

E


B

C

E


C

B

B

A

E
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Here, we can see that everyone is semiengaged but that the reduced table contains preferences
with more than a single entry for every agent. This means we need to use the second phase
of Irving’s algorithm to find a stable matching (or, conversely, verify that no stable matching
exists).

Phase 2
The second phase of the algorithm leads to further reductions in the preference table, proceeding iteratively until we reach one of two terminating conditions. In the first condition,
we have that each preference table contains only one person. In this case, we have a stable
matching. In the other condition, we have one person whose preference list is empty. In this
case no stable matching exists.
The procedure of Phase 2 involves identifying what Irving (1985) calls an all-or-nothing
cycle. This cycle consists of a sequence of pairs of agents

(a0 , b0 ), (a1 , b1 ) . . . (ar−1 , br−1 )

such that bi is the first person in ai ’s reduced preference list and the second person in ai−1 ’s
preference list. This sequence is called a cycle because it repeats after some fixed length
r. Thus all addition (subtraction) operations in the subscripts are taken modulo r. Irving
proves that such a cycle always exists in a Phase 1 reduced preference table which requires
a Phase 2 reduction. An example of such a table is the final table shown in Example B.1.
In order to find an all-or-nothing cycle, we implement the following steps (see Irving’s
paper for an explanation as to why these steps yield the correct sequence). Let x0 be an
arbitrary agent in the preference table who has more than one entry in her preference list.
Then we can generate the following sequences
• yi = The second person in xi ’s preference list.
• xi+1 = The last person in yi ’s preference list.
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The sequence xi will eventually cycle and thus we can define

ai = xs+i

(i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , r − 1)

where xs denotes the first element of the sequence xi to repeat. Now that we have sequence
ai , we can quickly determine the sequence bi . Phase 2 reduction involves removing the
all-or-nothing cycle from the preference table. In other words, we remove all the pairs
(ai , bi ),

i ∈ Z mod r. We summarize this process in the following pseudocode.

Function FindCycle(T ,A):
/* A represents set of agents.
/* T represents reduced preference table.
X ← Empty vector
Y ← Empty vector
A ← Empty vector
B ← Empty vector
X[0] ← a ∈ A s.t len(Pa ) > 1.
j←0
while X has no repetitions do
Y[j] ← PX[j] (2)
X[j + 1] ← PY [j] (−1)
j ←j+1
end
s ← index where X[j] first occurs.
A ← X with everything from X[1] to X[s − 1] removed.
B ← PA (2)
return (A,B)

*/
*/

Algorithm 2: Find an all-or-nothing cycle from a preference table.
Finally, actually removing the all-or-nothing cycle is summarized in the pseudocode below.
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Data: Preference Matrix
Result: Reduced Preference Table
A ← [a1 , a2 . . . an ] /* Generate agents
T ← [P1 , P2 , . . . , Pn ] /* generate preference matrix
T ← Phase1(T )/* Apply Phase 1
while T has mupltiple entries in each column do
T ← T \FindCycle(T, A)
end
if T has only one entry per column then
return T
end
if T has an empty column then
return No solution exists
end

*/
*/
*/

Algorithm 3: Phase 2 algorithm including Phase 1 as a function.

We show this in action by continuing the example we laid out in Phase 1.
Example B.2. Let us first set out the preference table found at the end of Example B.1.
A

B

C

D

E

F

B

.

D

F

.

A

.

E

E

C

C

B

F

F

.

.

.

D

.

A

.

.

B

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Let x0 = A. We can make the x, y sequences using the algorithm discussed earlier.
x

A

D

E

y

F

C

B

A

Since we have found the repeating pattern in the sequence x, we can now construct the
sequence ai = xs+i . Since s = 0 here, we simply have that ai = xi . The corresponding bi
sequence is found by simply finding the first choice of every agent ai . Thus in this case, the
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all-or-nothing cycle is (ai , bi ) = (A,B),(D,F),(E,C). Removing these from preference table
yields the following:
A

B

C

D

E

F

B

.

D

F


.

A

.

E

E


C

C

B

F

F

.

.

.

D

.

A

.

.

B

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Since we still have a preference table which is not completely reduced i.e. there are still
columns with multiple entries, we do another round of Phase 2 reduction. Let x0 =B this
time.
x

B

y

F

B

That was quick! Again s = 0 so ai = xi . Thus our all-or-nothing cycle is (B,F). Removing
this symmetrically, we have the completely reduced table
A

B

C

D

E

F

B

.

D

F


.

A

.

E

E


C

C

B

F

F


.

.

.

D

.

A

.

.

B

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Looking at the table, we can infer the stable matching (A,F),(B,E),(C,D).
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C

Bias and the Validity of Results

In section 2.3 of chapter 2, we saw that the estimates of the probability of solving a random stable roommates game i.e. p̂n,o appeared to be biased. In particular, we saw that
our estimates consistently appeared to underestimate the value of Pn,o , which we derived
using the multidimensional integral formula proved in section 2.2.4. Since we do not have a
similar expression to compute the probability of solving a roommates instance with partially
endogenous preferences i.e. Pn,r , we cannot say for certain that p̂n,r is biased with respect
to Pn,r with certainty. However, since the data generating processes for both estimates are
similar, it is reasonable to contend that the same kind of bias exists for the two estimates.
Bias Analysis

0.98

p^n;0
Pn;o

0.96
0.94

Probability

0.92
0.9
0.88
0.86
0.84
0.82
0.8
0.78
4

5

6

7

8

9

Size (n)

Figure 3.1: Graphs of Pn,o and p̂n,o for values of n up to 10.
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10

In particular, we expect the bias to be of the form

E[p̂n,o ] = Pn,o + f (n)
|{z}
bias

E[p̂n,r ] = Pn,r + f (n) .
|{z}
bias

Our test statistic is unaffected because

E[p̂n,o − p̂n,r ] = Pn,o − Pn,r .

45

D

Source Code

tests.r
This file conducts the hypothesis tests as outlined in section 2.2.5
library(stargazer)

# STANDARD MODEL
df <- read.csv(’data_32_1000_1_False_0.csv’)
len <- length(df$P1)
pvals <- numeric(len)
ssize <- 1000
for (i in 1:len)
{
result = prop.test(c(df$P1[i],df$P2[i]),c(ssize,ssize),alternative=’less’,conf.level =
df$P1[i] = df$P1[i]/ssize
df$P2[i] = df$P2[i]/ssize
pvals[i] = result$p.value
}
df$pvals = pvals
stargazer(df,summary = FALSE)

#HIGH SAMPLE SIZE MODELs
df2 <- read.csv(’data_32_10000_1_False_0.csv’)
len <- length(df2$P1)
pvals <- numeric(len)
ssize <- 10000
for (i in 1:len)
{
result = prop.test(c(df2$P1[i],df2$P2[i]),c(ssize,ssize),alternative=’less’,conf.level
df2$P1[i] = df2$P1[i]/ssize
df2$P2[i] = df2$P2[i]/ssize
pvals[i] = result$p.value
}
df2$pvals = pvals
stargazer(df2,summary=FALSE)
#k-Factor Model
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df3 <- read.csv(’data_32_1000_2_False_0.csv’)
len <- length(df3$P1)
pvals <- numeric(len)
ssize <- 1000
for (i in 1:len)
{
result = prop.test(c(df3$P1[i],df3$P2[i]),c(ssize,ssize),alternative=’less’,conf.level
df3$P1[i] = df3$P1[i]/ssize
df3$P2[i] = df3$P2[i]/ssize
pvals[i] = result$p.value
}
df3$pvals = pvals
stargazer(df3,summary=FALSE)

#Multiplicative model
df4 <- read.csv(’data_32_1000_1_True_0.csv’)
len <- length(df4$P1)
pvals <- numeric(len)
ssize <- 1000
for (i in 1:len)
{
result = prop.test(c(df4$P1[i],df4$P2[i]),c(ssize,ssize),alternative=’less’,conf.level
df4$P1[i] = df4$P1[i]/ssize
df4$P2[i] = df4$P2[i]/ssize
pvals[i] = result$p.value
}
df4$pvals = pvals
stargazer(df4,summary=FALSE)
game.py
This file implements in Python the procedures described in sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.3
# author: Yashaswi Mohanty
# last modified: 4/26/2018
import matplotlib
matplotlib.use(’Agg’)
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
import numpy as np
from stableroomate import *
import scipy.stats as stats
from multiprocessing import Pool
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import sys
import os.path
import pandas as pd

class Player:
def __init__(self, id, rooms=False):
"""
Constructor for player instance
:param id: player id
:param rooms: boolean value representing if the game is played with
information about rooms
"""
self.id = id
if rooms:
self.room_prefs = []
self.roommate_prefs = []
def get_id(self):
"""
Accessor for player id
:rtype: int
:return: player id
"""
return self.id
def get_room_prefs(self):
"""
Accessor for player room prefereneces
:rtype: list
:return: player room preferences
"""
return self.room_prefs

class Game:
def __init__(self, size, room_mode=False, k=1, mult=False):
"""
Initializes the game state.
:param size: The number of agents in the game. Has to be a multiple of 2
:param room_mode: Boolean values representing whether the game is being
played with room information
:param k: k-factor modified (see paper)
:param mult: Boolean value which controls whether we use the
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multiplicative or additive model
"""
if size % 2 != 0:
print "The game size must be even."
self.size = size
self.room_mode = room_mode
self.players = []
self.k = k
self.mult = mult
if room_mode:
self.rooms = range(self.size / 2)
for i in range(self.size):
self.players.append(Player(i, room_mode))
self.setup()
def setup(self):
"""
Sets up the preferences of the players
"""
# Construct room preferences randomly if in room mode
if self.room_mode:
for player in self.players:
player.room_prefs = np.random.permutation(self.rooms)
# Generate a matrix of random uniform (0,1) variables
pref_matrix = np.random.rand(self.size, self.size)
# This is a way of effectively preventing people from ranking themselves
as roommates.
np.fill_diagonal(pref_matrix, -9999999)
order_matrix = np.zeros((self.size, self.size - 1))
# generate the kendall tau values if in room mode
if self.room_mode:
taus = {}
for player1 in self.players:
p1_taus = {}
for player2 in self.players:
if player1 != player2:
p1_taus[player2.get_id()] = \
stats.kendalltau(player1.get_room_prefs(),
player2.get_room_prefs())[0]
taus[player1.get_id()] = p1_taus
# add or multiply kendall tau values depending on the model being
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used.
for i in range(self.size):
for j in range(self.size):
if i != j:
if self.mult:
pref_matrix[i][j] *= self.k * taus[i][j]
else:
pref_matrix[i][j] += self.k * taus[i][j]
# just in case
np.fill_diagonal(pref_matrix, -999999)
# generate preferences from the random matrix
for i in range(self.size):
order_matrix[i] = pref_matrix[i].argsort()[::-1][:self.size - 1]
# format the preference lists as a Python dictionary which can be read by
our implementation of Irving’s algorithm.
self.prefs = self.generate_dict(order_matrix)

@staticmethod
def generate_dict(order_matrix):
"""
Generates a dictionary of preferences from the matrix of preferences
:param order_matrix: matrix of preferences
:return: prefs: a dictionary of preferences
"""
prefs = {}
for i in range(order_matrix.shape[0]):
prefs[str(i)] = [str(int(j)) for j in order_matrix[i]]
return prefs
def play(self):
"""
play a round of the stableroommates game with the given preferences
:return: a stable matching or None, depending on whether a matching
exists.
"""
return stableroomate(self.prefs, parse=False)
# non parallel version of the game
def game(size, iter, k=1, mult=False):
norm_solns = []
for i, x in zip(range(4, size, 2), range((size - 4) / 2)):
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game = Game(i, False, k, mult)
norm_solns.append(0)
for j in range(iter):
game.setup()
value = game.play()
if value is not None:
norm_solns[x] += 1
norm_solns[x] = float(norm_solns[x]) / iter
room_solns = []
for i, x in zip(range(4, size, 2), range((size - 4) / 2)):
game2 = Game(i, True, k, mult)
room_solns.append(0)
for j in range(iter):
game2.setup()
value = game2.play()
if value is not None:
room_solns[x] += 1
room_solns[x] = float(room_solns[x]) / iter
plt.plot(range(4, size, 2), norm_solns)
plt.plot(range(4, size, 2), room_solns)
plt.savefig(’fig1’)

def game_parallel(size, iter, k=1, mult=False):
"""
The main function of our simulation.
:param size: The number of agents in the simulation
:param iter: The sample size of the simulation
:param k: The k-factor
:param mult: Boolean value for determining whether we are using a
multiplicative model or an additive model
"""
# init lists for containing the values of p_{n,o}
norm_solns = []
norm_props = []
for i, x in zip(range(4, size, 2), range((size - 4) / 2)):
game = Game(i, False, k, mult)
norm_solns.append(0)
# run game in Parallel with 5 processes
values = Pool(5).map(parallel, [game] * iter)
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norm_solns[x] = sum(values)
norm_props.append(float(norm_solns[x]) / iter)
# init lists for containing the values of p_{n,r}
room_solns = []
room_props = []
for i, x in zip(range(4, size, 2), range((size - 4) / 2)):
game2 = Game(i, True, k, mult)
room_solns.append(0)
# run game in parallel with 5 processes
values = Pool(5).map(parallel, [game2] * iter)
room_solns[x] = sum(values)
room_props.append(float(room_solns[x]) / iter)
#generate figure
l1, = plt.plot(range(4, size, 2), norm_props, label=’Normal Simulated
Probabilities’)
l2, = plt.plot(range(4, size, 2), room_props, label=’Augmented Simulated
Probabilities’)
l3, = plt.plot([4, 6, 8, 10], [0.963, 0.933, 0.91, 0.89], label=’Theoretical
Probabilities’)
plt.xlabel(’Size (n)’)
plt.ylabel(’Probability’)
plt.legend([l1, l2, l3])
#generate csv for hypothesis testing
out = [(i, j) for i, j in zip(norm_solns, room_solns)]
labels = [’P1’, ’P2’]
df = pd.DataFrame.from_records(out, columns=labels,index=range(4,size,2))
# make sure we are not overwriting other files while saving csv and figures
m1 = 0
while os.path.exists(’data_%d_%d_%d_%s_%d.csv’ % (size,iter,k,mult,m1)):
print "T1"
m1 = m1 + 1
df.to_csv(’data_%d_%d_%d_%s_%d.csv’ % (size,iter,k,mult,m1))
m2 = 0
#print "fig%d" % m2
while os.path.exists(’fig_%d_%d_%d_%s_%d.png’ % (size,iter,k,mult,m2)):
print "T2"
m2 = m2 + 1
plt.savefig(’fig_%d_%d_%d_%s_%d.png’ % (size,iter,k,mult,m2))
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# wrapper function
def parallel(game):
game.setup()
value = game.play()
if value is not None:
return 1
else:
return 0

if __name__ == ’__main__’:
game_parallel(int(sys.argv[1]), int(sys.argv[2]), float(sys.argv[3]),
sys.argv[4])

stableroomate.py
For a given set of preferences, returns a stable solution if one exists.
This code was based on the free to use source code provided by the Coe College of Computer Science (2012) on their Github. This code was modified by the author and Kyle
McDonnell to correct errors and make it usable for the application the author was considering.
#!/usr/bin/env python
import
import
import
import
import

csv
logging
optparse
random
sys

log = logging.getLogger("stableroommate")

# log.setLevel(logging.INFO)

def readprefs(prefsfn):
"""
read the preferences from "prefs.csv"
"""
inner = csv.reader(open(prefsfn))
prefs = {}
for line in inner:
if len(line) == 0: continue
line = [s.strip() for s in line]
prefs[line[0]] = line[1:]
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return prefs

def fillin(prefs):
"""
some choices may not include everyone.
fill in the rest by rearranging the others available at random.
"""
names = set(prefs.keys())
for name, choices in prefs.iteritems():
left = set(names).difference([name]).difference(choices)
if len(left) > 0:
print("Filling in for", left)
left = list(left)
random.shuffle(left)
choices.extend(left)

def checkprefs(prefs):
"""
- ‘prefs‘: preferences dict, name key, list of names as choices in order
"""
names = set(prefs.keys())
for name, choices in prefs.iteritems():
try:
assert len(names.difference(choices)) == 1
except AssertionError, e:
log.warning("len(names.difference(choices)) = {0} != 0".format(
len(names.difference(choices))))
log.warning(name, choices)
log.warning(names.difference(choices))
raise AssertionError(e)
try:
assert len(choices) == len(names) - 1
except AssertionError, e:
log.critical("len(choices) != len(names) - 1")
log.critical("{0} != {1}".format(len(choices), len(names) - 1))
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log.critical("{0} {1}".format(name, choices))
raise AssertionError(e)

def verify_ranks(ranks, prefs):
"""
check that ranks and prefs correspond
Arguments:
- ‘ranks‘: dict mapping name to rank index
- ‘prefs‘: preferences dict, name key, list of names as choices in order
"""
for n in ranks:
for m in ranks[n]:
idx = ranks[n][m]
try:
assert m == prefs[n][idx]
except AssertionError, e:
log.critical("m != prefs[n][idx]")
log.critical("{0} != {1}".format(m, prefs[n][idx]))
raise AssertionError(e)

def reject(prefs, ranks, holds):
"""
This does a reduction of the ranks if either of the following conditions
holds.
(i)
(ii)
"""
for y in holds:
# n holds holds[n]
i = 0
x = holds[y]
while i < len(prefs[y]):
yi = prefs[y][i]
try:
if yi == x:
prefs[y] = prefs[y][:i + 1]
# lower rank is better
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elif ranks[yi][holds[yi]] < ranks[yi][y]:
prefs[y].pop(i)
continue
i += 1
except KeyError:
#print "bro"
return -1

def find_all_or_nothing(prefs, ranks, holds):
"""
Find an all or nothing cycle.
Arguments:
- ‘prefs‘:
- ‘ranks‘:
- ‘holds‘:
"""
p = []
q = []
# first find a key that has more than one pref left
for x in sorted(prefs):
if len(prefs[x]) > 1:
cur = x
break
else:
return None
# trace through
while cur not in p:
# q_i = second person in p_i’s list
q.append(prefs[cur][1])
# p_{i+1} = q_i’ last person
p.append(cur)
cur = prefs[q[-1]][-1]
a = p[p.index(cur):]
b = [prefs[n][0] for n in a]
return a

def kylephase1(prefs):
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# Attempted proposals for each roommate
attempted_proposals = dict((name, 0) for name in prefs.keys())
# Set of currently promised pairs
promises = dict((name, None) for name in prefs.keys())
# Give each person a chance to propose to others
proposer_list = prefs.keys()
proposer = proposer_list[0]
# Propose to others in order of preference
while proposer is not None:
# Remove this proposer from the list to propose if they are there
if proposer in proposer_list:
proposer_list.remove(proposer)
# If this proposer has tried to propose to all preferences already, no
solution exists!
if attempted_proposals[proposer] == len(prefs[proposer]):
# print("MATCHING FAILED (oh no!)")
return promises # TODO or null?
# Otherwise get the next proposal target and increment the number of
attempted proposals
target = prefs[proposer][attempted_proposals[proposer]]
attempted_proposals[proposer] += 1
# If the target is not promised, or they prefer the proposer, its a match
made in heaven!
existing_promise = promises[target]
if existing_promise is None or prefs[target].index(proposer) <=
prefs[target].index(existing_promise):
# Give them a promise ring
promises[target] = proposer
# Let the rejected make new proposals.
if existing_promise is not None:
proposer = existing_promise
# If there is no proposer, get the next one or simply stop
elif len(proposer_list) > 0:
proposer = proposer_list[0]
else:
proposer = None
#print promises
# If the loop finished, everyone made promise -- We have weddings to plan
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return promises

def phase1(prefs, ranks, curpref=None, debug=False):
"""
perform phase 1 of the stable roomates problem.
Arguments:
- ‘prefs‘: preferences dict, name key, list of names as choices in order
- ‘ranks‘: dict mapping name to rank index
"""
# holds
print prefs
print ranks
print "...................\n\n\n"
holds = dict((name, None) for name in prefs.keys())
print holds
if curpref is None:
curpref = dict((name, 0) for name in prefs.keys())
print curpref
people = prefs.keys()
random.shuffle(people)
proposed_to = set()
# log.info("-- phase 1 -----------")
# log.debug("{0}".format(people))
# print "Entering loop 1"
for person in people:
poser = person
print person
while (1):
# find poser someone
# print "Entering loop 3"
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# print curpref
while curpref[poser] < len(prefs[poser]):
# person poser is proposing to
nchoice = prefs[poser][curpref[poser]]
curpref[poser] += 1
# person poser is holding
cchoice = holds[nchoice]
# print ("{0} proposes to {1};".format(poser, nchoice))
# lower ranking is better
if cchoice is None or \
ranks[nchoice][poser] < ranks[nchoice][cchoice]:
# print "Exit loop 3"
break
# print("{0} rejects {1};".format(nchoice, poser))
# print("{0} holds {1}".format(nchoice, poser))
holds[nchoice] = poser
if nchoice not in proposed_to:
# print "Exit loop 2"
# log.warning("done")
assert cchoice is None
break
# log.warning("and rejects {0}".format(cchoice))
poser = cchoice
# print poser
#
# print nchoice
proposed_to.add(nchoice)
#
#
#
#
#
#
#

print holds
print proposed_to
print poser
print cchoice

return holds
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def newphase1(prefs, ranks, curpref=None, debug=False):
"""
perform phase 1 of the stable roommates problem.
Arguments:
- ‘prefs‘: preferences dict, name key, list of names as choices in order
- ‘ranks‘: dict mapping name to rank index
"""
# holds
holds = dict((name, None) for name in prefs.keys())
# print holds
if curpref is None:
curpref = dict((name, 0) for name in prefs.keys())
# print curpref
people = prefs.keys()
random.shuffle(people) # TODO Kyle says: no need to shuffle people
proposed_to = set()
# log.info("-- phase 1 -----------")
# log.debug("{0}".format(people))
# print "Entering loop 1"
for person in people:
poser = person
while poser is not None:
# find poser someone
# While there are still people to consider proposing to for
# this proposer, try to propose
while True:
# TODO Kyle added this. This is the correct condition
# If the person has run out of people to propose to,
# they are left alone and there is no stable solution!
if curpref[poser] == len(prefs[poser]):
# print("MATCHING FAILED (oh no!)")
return holds
# person poser is proposing to
nchoice = prefs[poser][curpref[poser]]
curpref[poser] += 1
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# person poser is holding
held = holds[nchoice]
# print ("{0} proposes to {1};".format(poser, nchoice))
# If the proposer is better than the current choice’s hold
# of they don’t have one, tentatively accept proposal
# lower ranking is better
if held is None or ranks[nchoice][poser] < ranks[nchoice][held]:
# print("{0} rejects {1};".format(nchoice, held))
break
# print("{0} rejects {1};".format(nchoice, poser))
# When the above loop ends, someone has accepted our proposal
# Add this to the list of held proposals, and if someone became
rejected,
# allow them to make new proposals next
# print("{0} holds {1}".format(nchoice, poser))
previously_held = holds[nchoice] # TODO Kyle added this line.
# TODO You didn’t have access to this variable before and used it
below
holds[nchoice] = poser
# TODO Kyle commented this out
# if nchoice not in proposed_to:
#
#print "Exit loop 2"
#
# log.warning("done")
#
assert held is None
#
break
# log.warning("and rejects {0}".format(cchoice))
poser = previously_held
proposed_to.add(nchoice) # TODO Kyle this line was indented
incorrectly
# print holds
#
# print proposed_to
#
# print poser
#
# print cchoice
return holds

61

def stableroomate(prefsfn, debug=False, parse=True):
"""
find a stable roommate matching
"""
#print "**********NEW***********"
# read prefs from file
# print "Reading preferences..."
if parse:
prefs = readprefs(prefsfn)
else:
prefs = prefsfn
# print prefs
# make sure everyone has the same number of choices
# print "Filling in preferences..."
fillin(prefs)
# validate that names are correct
# print "Validating preferences..."
checkprefs(prefs)
# generate a dictionary of rank values for each name
# print "Generating dictionaries..."
ranks = dict((idx, dict(zip(val, range(len(val)))))
for idx, val in prefs.iteritems())
# print prefs
# print(ranks)
# validate the ranks correspond to the proper indices
# print "Verifying ranks..."
verify_ranks(ranks, prefs)
# phase1
# print "Phase 1..."
holds = kylephase1(prefs)
# print "Holds done"
#print "HOLDS: ", holds
log_holds(holds)
error = reject(prefs, ranks, holds)
#print "ERROR: ",error
# print "Rejections done"
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if error == -1:
#print("Returning none")
return None
cycle = find_all_or_nothing(prefs, ranks, holds)
# print "Cycles found"
if cycle is not None and len(cycle) == 3:
# print "no solution exists"
return
## phase 2
# print "Phase 2"
while cycle is not None:
log.debug("-- cycle detected -----------")
log.debug("{0}".format(cycle))
curpref = {}
for x in prefs:
if x in cycle:
curpref[x] = 1
else:
curpref[x] = 0
holds = newphase1(prefs, ranks, curpref)
log_holds(holds)
error = reject(prefs, ranks, holds)
if error == -1:
return None
cycle = find_all_or_nothing(prefs, ranks, holds)
# print "***********RESULTS*********"
# print prefs
# print ranks
return holds

def log_holds(holds):
"""
Arguments:
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- ‘holds‘:
"""
log.info("-- holds -----------")
for h in holds:
log.info("{0} {1}".format(h, holds[h]))

def log_prefs(prefs):
"""
Arguments:
- ‘prefs‘:
"""
log.info("-- prefs -----------")
for x in sorted(prefs):
log.info("{0}\t{1}".format(x, " ".join(prefs[x])))

def swap_better(set1, set2, ranks):
"""
"""
x1, y1 = set1
x2, y2 = set2
x1y1
y1x1
x2y2
y2x2

=
=
=
=

ranks[x1][y1]
ranks[y1][x1]
ranks[x2][y2]
ranks[y2][x2]

x1x2
x2x1
y1y2
y2y1

=
=
=
=

ranks[x1][x2]
ranks[x2][x1]
ranks[y1][y2]
ranks[y2][y1]

x2y1
y1x2
x1y2
y2x1

=
=
=
=

ranks[x2][y1]
ranks[y1][x2]
ranks[x1][y2]
ranks[y2][x1]

if x1x2 < x1y1 and x2x1 < x2y2 and y1y2 < y1x1 and y2y1 < y2x2:
log.error("({0},{1}) ({2},{3}) -> ({4},{5}) ({6},{7})".format(
x1, y1, x2, y2, x1, x2, y1, y2))
log.error("({0},{1}) ({2},{3}) -> ({4},{5}) ({6},{7})".format(
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x1y1, y1x1, x2y2, y2x2, x1x2, x2x1, y1y2, y2y1))
if x2y1 < x2y2 and y1x2 < y1x1 and x1y2 < x1y1 and y2x1 < y2x2:
log.error("({0},{1}) ({2},{3}) -> ({4},{5}) ({6},{7})".format(
x1, y1, x2, y2, x1, y2, x2, y1))
log.error("({0},{1}) ({2},{3}) -> ({4},{5}) ({6},{7})".format(
x1y1, y1x1, x2y2, y2x2, x1y2, y2x1, x2y1, y1x2))

def verify_match(matches):
"""
"""
prefsfn = sys.argv[1]
# read prefs from file
prefs = readprefs(prefsfn)
fillin(prefs)
# generate a dictionary of rank values for each name
ranks = dict((idx, dict(zip(val, range(len(val)))))
for idx, val in prefs.iteritems())
for x in matches:
for y in matches:
if y == x or y == matches[x]:
continue
set1 = (x, matches[x])
set2 = (y, matches[y])
swap_better(set1, set2, ranks)

def main():
"""
main function
"""
# random.seed(1000)
parser = optparse.OptionParser(usage="usage: %prog [options] prefsfn")
parser.add_option("-v", dest="validate", action="store_true",
default=False, help="Validate the Algorithm")
parser.add_option("-d", dest="debug", action="store_true",
default=False, help="Print Debuggin Code")
(options, args) = parser.parse_args()
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if options.debug:
logging.basicConfig(level=logging.DEBUG)
if len(args) < 1:
parser.print_help()
return
print "Finding matches..."
# print args[0]
matches = stableroomate(args[0], options.debug)
if matches is not None:
print("-- matches -----------")
for m in matches:
print "{0} {1}".format(m, matches[m])
if options.validate:
log.info("verifying matches...")
verify_match(matches)

if __name__ == ’__main__’:
main()
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